Exodus Chapter 21 Read as one passage
Exodus 21:29–31
Put together from the study of each verse: what each one meant, in order, with the background, words and debates of the whole passage said once.
29But if the ox has a habit of goring, and its owner has been warned yet does not restrain it, and it kills a man or woman, then the ox must be stoned and its owner must also be put to death. 30If payment is demanded of him instead, he may redeem his life by paying the full amount demanded of him. 31If the ox gores a son or a daughter, it shall be done to him according to the same rule.
What the first hearers heard
To Israelite farmers and village elders this was practical law for a common, deadly accident, and it also stated a value.
- It separated accident from negligence. A first goring was nobody's fault (v.28). Once the animal's habit was established and formally made known, the owner was answerable. Elders hearing a case would ask: was it a known gorer? Was testimony given? Did he guard it?
- It treated a death as a matter of life, not money. Neighbouring legal traditions put a silver price on the dead person, scaled by class. Israel's law says the owner's life is forfeit. Any payment (v.30) is a ransom for his life, set by the bereaved, not a fee for the victim. Man and woman are treated equally.
- It dealt with blood-guilt. Stoning the animal and refusing its meat removed the shed blood from among the community. No one could profit from the carcass of a beast that had killed a person.
- It allowed mercy without denying guilt. The owner was guilty, but he had not intended the death. So, unlike a murderer (Num 35:31), he could ransom his life. The law marks how serious his failure was, and also its limits.
From the study of Exodus 21:29.
Verse by verse
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29But if the ox has a habit of goring, and its owner has been warned yet does not restrain it, and it kills a man or woman, then the ox must be stoned and its owner must also be put to death.
Full study →"But suppose the ox was already a known gorer. It had shown this 'yesterday and the day before', that is, it had a track record. Formal testimony about it had been put on record against its owner, and still he did not keep it under guard. Then it kills a man or a woman. In that case the ox is to be stoned, as a killer is stoned, and its owner too has forfeited his life."
Three things change between this verse and the one before it. In v.28 the owner is "clean" and loses only his animal. Here the owner (1) owns an animal that is by habit a gorer, (2) has been formally put on notice, and (3) failed in his duty to keep it guarded. Knowing of the danger and then doing nothing makes the death partly his doing. The penalty is equal whether the victim is a man or a woman.
The sentence "he shall be put to death" is real, but the next verse qualifies it at once: the victim's family may instead set a ransom for his life (kōfer), and he must pay whatever they set. The law is saying two things together. A human life is not something to be settled by a standard fine, so the owner's life is the measure of the debt. Yet the owner is not a murderer, so his life may be redeemed.
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30If payment is demanded of him instead, he may redeem his life by paying the full amount demanded of him.
Full study →The verse picks up straight after the hard sentence of verse 29. An ox was known to gore, its owner was formally warned, he did not keep it penned, and it killed someone. The ox is stoned, and the owner too has forfeited his life. Then comes the alternative: "If a ransom-price is laid on him, then he must pay the buy-back price for his life, every bit of whatever is laid on him."
Two money words carry the verse. The first, kofer, is a substitute payment: silver put in the place of a life to settle a claim against it. The second, pidyon, is a redemption-price: the price that buys something back out of forfeiture. Israelites knew this price from buying back a firstborn or freeing a slave. Together they say that in law the owner's life is no longer his own. Because of the death he caused, it stands forfeit to the victim's side, and he can have it back only by paying for it. The verb is passive ("is laid on him"), so the verse does not name who sets the figure. The same idiom in verse 22 points to the injured family, perhaps with judges involved. Either way the guilty man does not set the price himself. The closing phrase, "according to all that is laid on him", shuts off any bargaining down: the price, once fixed, must be paid in full.
To its first hearers the verse also marked a boundary. A ransom was never allowed for a deliberate murderer (Numbers 35:31). Allowing one here classes the negligent owner's guilt as grave enough to deserve death, yet different in kind from murder.
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31If the ox gores a son or a daughter, it shall be done to him according to the same rule.
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Where the English drifted
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in v29
warned (BSB, NIV, ESV, NASB); informed (NLT)
hu'ad
- What we hear
- Someone mentioned to the owner that his animal was dangerous, a friendly or informal caution.
- What they heard
- Formal testimony was given against him, a notice on record and before witnesses that fixed his legal knowledge of the danger. Mesopotamian parallels have local authorities deliver it.
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in v29
ox
shor
- What we hear
- A castrated draft steer, often thought of as placid.
- What they heard
- Any single head of cattle, bull, cow or bullock. Here it is plainly an animal with horns and a temper, and WEB's "bull" is closer to how it would have been pictured.
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in v30
ransom (WEB, KJV 'ransom of his life', ESV, NASB)
kōfer / pidyōn
- What we hear
- Money a kidnapper extorts in exchange for a hostage, or, for church readers, an image of Christ's death paying for sin.
- What they heard
- A lawful compensation price paid by a guilty party to the victim's family. It stands in for, and buys back, the payer's own forfeited life.
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in v30
atonement (YLT)
kōfer
- What we hear
- Religious reconciliation with God, or making amends emotionally.
- What they heard
- A cash settlement that cancels a legal claim on a life. The word is related to the vocabulary of atonement, but here no sacrifice or priest is involved.
Every word
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וְאִ֡ם
ve'im · H0518A
and if · v29, v30
Opens a sub-case of the law in v.28. Verse 28 began with kî ("when"), the main case; 'im ("but if") introduces a variation on it, the usual way these case laws are built.
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שׁוֹר֩
shor · H7794
ox, head of cattle · v29
A single head of cattle, bull or cow, the ordinary working and herd animal of an Israelite farm. It is not specifically a castrated draft ox.
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נַגָּ֨ח
naggach · H5056
given to goring · v29
This word pattern names a habit or trait: not an ox that gored once but "a gorer". It appears only here and in v.36, and it matches the Akkadian legal term for a known gorer (nakkāpû).
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ה֜וּא
hu · H1931
it · v29
Stands in for the verb "is": "an ox, a gorer it [is]". It presents the goring as what the animal is known to be.
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מִתְּמֹ֣ל
mittemol · H8543
from yesterday · v29
The first half of a fixed phrase meaning "previously, before now". Here it sets up a track record that came before the fatal incident.
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שִׁלְשֹׁ֗ם
shilshom · H8032
day before yesterday · v29
Literally "three days ago". Together with temol it is an idiom for "in the past, heretofore" (Gen 31:2; 1 Sam 21:5). Later rabbis took the 'three' as part of a three-strikes rule (see debates).
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וְהוּעַ֤ד
vehu'ad · H5749B
it has been testified / formal warning given · v29
A passive verb with no named subject: "testimony was given". It means a solemn notice, the kind given before witnesses, not a casual remark. The owner is now on record as knowing.
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בִּבְעָלָיו֙
biv'alav · H1167G
against its owner · v29
"Against/to its owner." The noun is plural in form, but Hebrew regularly uses the plural form of "owner/master" for a single owner (Isa 1:3), and the next verb is singular. The preposition be- with this verb means testifying to someone in a way that binds them.
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וְלֹ֣א
velo · H3808
and not · v29
Negates the next verb. The owner's failure to act is what makes him guilty.
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יִשְׁמְרֶ֔נּוּ
yishmerennu · H8104I
he guards / keeps watch over it · v29
"He does not keep it", meaning he does not keep the animal under watch and control (penned, tethered, supervised). The same verb is used for guarding property or a person in someone's care. (The supplied gloss "look at" is too weak here.)
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וְהֵמִ֥ית
vehemit · H4191
and it causes death / kills · v29
The causative form of "die". The ox is the subject: the animal brings about a human death. In v.28 the wording was "gores ... and he dies"; here it is stated directly that it killed.
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אִ֖ישׁ
'ish · H0376G
a man · v29
A male person. Paired with "woman", it covers any free adult human victim.
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א֣וֹ
'o · H0176A
or · v29
Joins the two victims. The law runs the same way whichever one is killed.
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אִשָּׁ֑ה
'ishshah · H0802G
a woman · v29
A female victim counts the same as a male one. Verse 31 goes further and adds sons and daughters. Comparable Mesopotamian laws set the penalty by the victim's class.
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יִסָּקֵ֔ל
yissaqel · H5619
shall be stoned · v29
"It shall be stoned", a public execution carried out by the community, the way a human capital offender was put to death. In v.28 the stronger form "must surely be stoned" is used. Here the stoning is assumed, and the new point is the owner.
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וְגַם־
vegam · H1571
and also · v29
"And also", "as well". It is emphatic: unlike v.28, where the owner is "clean", here the guilt reaches past the animal to the man.
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כֹּפֶר
kōfer · H3724A
ransom, compensation price · v30
A payment that takes the place of a life that has been forfeited. Here it is the sum that buys off the death sentence of v. 29 by compensating the dead person's family.
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יוּשַׁת
yûšat · H7896G
be set, be laid · v30
A passive form of the ordinary verb 'to put, set'. The payment is 'laid on' the owner by someone else. The verse does not say who, but v. 22 uses the same idiom for the injured party's family setting the amount.
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עָלָיו
ʿālāyw · H5921A
upon him · v30
The obligation rests on the ox's owner personally, like a weight placed on him.
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וְנָתַן
wənātan · H5414N
and he shall give · v30
'Then he shall give/pay.' In this legal construction the verb states what must follow once the payment has been set: he pays it, and he is not free to refuse or haggle.
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פִּדְיֹן
pidyōn · H6306B
redemption-price · v30
The price that buys something back out of a claim on it. It comes from the same root as the redemption of firstborn animals and sons and of slaves (see 21:8 in this chapter). Here what is bought back is the owner's own forfeited life.
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נַפְשׁוֹ
nafšô · H5315H
his life · v30
His living self, his life. The word does not mean an immaterial 'soul' here. It is the life the law of v. 29 had declared forfeit.
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כְּכֹל
kəkōl · H3605
according to all · v30
'According to all': he pays the whole amount set, not a part of it.
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אֲשֶׁר־
ʾăšer · H0834A
that, which · v30
Links the amount paid to whatever was fixed: 'all that…'.
The world behind it
A case law in the "Book of the Covenant." Exodus 21–23 is a collection of mishpatim, rulings written as "if X happens, then Y". Verses 28–32 handle a goring ox, a real and familiar danger in a farming society where cattle pulled ploughs and threshing sledges and moved through villages and lanes.
A shared legal tradition, with deliberate differences. The goring-ox case is one of the clearest points of contact between biblical law and older Mesopotamian law:
- Laws of Eshnunna §54 (about 1800 BC): if an ox is a gorer, the ward authorities notify its owner, he does not keep it in check, and it gores a man to death, the owner pays 40 shekels (two-thirds of a mina) of silver.
- Laws of Hammurabi §251 (about 1750 BC): if the city-quarter authorities have told the owner his ox is a gorer, and he neither (probably) blunts its horns nor controls it, and it kills a free man, he pays 30 shekels. A slave's death costs 20 shekels (§252). Hammurabi §250 makes a first-time goring non-actionable, much like Exod 21:28.
Exodus keeps the same structure: a known gorer, formal notice, failure to guard, death. But it changes the outcome. (1) The ox is stoned, and its meat may not be eaten. The Mesopotamian laws have no such provision. (2) The owner's life is forfeit, not a fixed amount of silver. (3) A ransom may be negotiated (v.30), set by the injured side rather than by a price list. (4) Man or woman, son or daughter (v.31) are treated alike. Only a slave's death is fixed at a price (30 shekels, v.32).
Why stone an animal? Behind the provision lies Gen 9:5–6: God "requires" the blood of a human even "from every beast". An animal that has shed human blood carries blood-guilt. It is executed by the community like a human killer, and its carcass is unclean for food, so no one profits from it. Stoning was carried out by the community, so the community as a whole removed the guilt.
Negligence as a category. The same principle runs through nearby laws: the uncovered pit (21:33–34), the gorer that kills another ox (21:36), and later the roof without a parapet (Deut 22:8). A person who knowingly leaves a lethal hazard in place answers for what it does.
From the study of Exodus 21:29.
Where scholars differ
in v29
Was the negligent owner actually executed, or is "shall be put to death" a statement of liability that was normally settled by ransom?
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Liability, normally ransomed: the owner's life is forfeit in principle, and v.30 expects the matter to be settled by kōfer.
Verse 30 follows at once and assumes the ransom option. This is the only place the Torah allows ransom for a life, and it fits a death caused by negligence, not intent (contrast Num 35:31). The Mesopotamian parallels likewise settle by payment. Many modern commentators take this view (e.g. Sarna, Propp, Westbrook).
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A real capital sentence, with ransom only if the victim's kin chose to accept it.
The wording yûmāt is the ordinary death-penalty formula of the code (21:12–17). Verse 30's "if a ransom is laid on him" is conditional, so the bereaved could refuse. Greenberg argued that biblical law deliberately treats human life as beyond monetary valuation, and this verse sharpens that point against Mesopotamian fines.
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Rabbinic reading: "death at the hands of Heaven", not by a human court, which imposes only the ransom.
Mekhilta de-Rabbi Ishmael (Nezikin 10) and b. Sanhedrin 15b hold that a human court does not execute the owner of a goring ox. This is ancient interpretation, not the plain wording, but it shows how early readers understood the verse alongside v.30.
in v29
Why is the ox stoned and its meat forbidden, when Mesopotamian law simply fines the owner?
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Blood-guilt: an animal that sheds human blood is guilty and must be removed (Gen 9:5).
Gen 9:5 says God requires human blood "from every beast". Stoning is the community's execution method, and the ban on eating the meat treats the carcass as tainted.
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A breach of the created order: the ox has rebelled against human dominion and is treated like a rebel.
J. J. Finkelstein, *The Ox That Gored* (1981), argued that the stoning reflects a cosmology in which the beast that kills its master overturns the order of Gen 1:26–28. Stoning in the Bible is often linked to offences against the community's basic order.
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Practical and deterrent: destroy the danger and remove any profit from it.
Forbidding the meat means the owner gains nothing from the animal's death. This is consistent with the code's focus on loss and responsibility. Most scholars see this as at most a secondary factor, since a practical aim alone would not explain stoning rather than ordinary slaughter.
in v29
Does "from yesterday, three days ago" set a legal count (three gorings or three days) or simply mean "previously"?
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Idiom for "previously": it establishes a prior record, not a number.
The same phrase means simply "before, formerly" across the Hebrew Bible (Gen 31:2; Exod 5:7; Ruth 2:11; 1 Sam 21:5).
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A three-strikes threshold (later Jewish law).
Mishnah Bava Qamma 2:4 defines the forewarned ox (mûʿād) by threes: Rabbi Meir says after goring three times, and Rabbi Judah says when testimony has been given over three days. This is a legitimate legal working-out of the wording, though not its plain idiomatic sense.
in v30
Who sets the ransom amount: the victim's family or a court?
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The bereaved family names the price.
In v. 22 the same idiom ('lay upon him') is used of the injured woman's husband. In Israel the victim's kin held the blood-claim (the *goʾel haddam*, 'avenger of blood'). Raymond Westbrook and others read v. 30 as the family's option to accept payment instead of execution.
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Judges or elders fix or supervise the amount.
The verb is passive and names no agent. In v. 22 the payment is made *bifelilîm*, often taken as 'as the judges determine'. Rabbinic law (Mekhilta; b. Bava Kamma 40a) handles *kofer* as a court-assessed payment.
in v30
Was the owner's death sentence (v. 29) meant to be carried out, or was it a maximum that set up the ransom?
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It was a real capital liability, with ransom as a merciful exception.
The plain wording 'shall be put to death' and the contrast with murder in Num 35:31, where ransom is barred. In this reading the law takes the life principle seriously.
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It was effectively a ceiling that set up negotiation.
Mesopotamian parallels for the same case impose only money. Scholars such as Westbrook and Bernard Jackson read biblical 'shall die' clauses in some private-wrong cases as marking the injured party's maximum right, which ransom then commutes.
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Death 'at the hands of Heaven', not of a human court.
Rabbinic interpretation (e.g., Mekhilta on this passage; b. Sanhedrin 15b) took v. 29 as divine punishment, with the *kofer* serving to atone. This is a later interpretive framework, not the plain sense of the text.
in v30
Is the ransom measured by the victim's worth or the owner's worth?
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The value of the victim.
The majority rabbinic view in b. Bava Kamma 40a: the payment compensates for the life lost.
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The value of the owner.
A minority rabbinic view in the same passage, based on the wording 'redemption-price of *his* life': what is being bought back is the owner's own forfeited life.
Sources
- BDB s.v. נַגָּח, עוּד, שָׁמַר, תְּמוֹל
- HALOT s.v. עוד (Hiphil/Hophal 'to warn, testify')
- M. T. Roth, Law Collections from Mesopotamia and Asia Minor (Laws of Eshnunna §§53–55; Laws of Hammurabi §§250–252)
- J. J. Finkelstein, The Ox That Gored (1981)
- M. Greenberg, "Some Postulates of Biblical Criminal Law" (1960)
- N. Sarna, JPS Torah Commentary: Exodus
- W. H. C. Propp, Exodus 19–40 (Anchor Bible)
- R. Westbrook, Studies in Biblical and Cuneiform Law
- Mishnah Bava Qamma 1:4; 2:4
- Mekhilta de-Rabbi Ishmael, Nezikin 10; b. Sanhedrin 15b
- Septuagint (Rahlfs) Exod 21:29; Vulgate Exod 21:29
- BDB s.v. כֹּפֶר, פִּדְיוֹן, שִׁית
- HALOT s.v. כֹּפֶר I; פִּדְיוֹן
- Laws of Hammurabi §§250–252 (goring ox)
- Laws of Eshnunna §§53–55
- M. Greenberg, 'Some Postulates of Biblical Criminal Law' (1960)
- R. Westbrook, Studies in Biblical and Cuneiform Law (1988)
- J. Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16 (Anchor Bible), on kipper and kofer
- Mekhilta de-Rabbi Ishmael, Nezikin on Exod 21:29–30
- Babylonian Talmud, Bava Kamma 40a; Sanhedrin 15b
- Septuagint, Exodus 21:30
Original-language data: STEPBible TAHOT/TAGNT (CC BY 4.0).
1 of these verses not studied yet; their meaning appears here once they are.